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Abstract
The paper addresses the issue of coordinated effects of mergers in the frame-
work of a differentiated products model. Firms’ assets are product varieties
that can be sold individually or entirely transfered to another firm in a
merger. We show that under symmetric optimal punishment schemes the
highest feasible collusive price declines from any asset transfer to the largest
firm as long as the size of the smallest firm is unchanged. In contrast, for
fully optimal punishment schemes the prices of firms that get larger increase
and those of firms that get smaller decrease. However, in all cases mergers
are unprofitable unless the length of product lines is very asymmetric. We
discuss the implications of the analysis for merger policy
JEL.: D43, K21, L13, L41.
Keywords: collusion, product lines, mergers, coordinated effects, joint
dominance.
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1 Introduction
In merger policy concerns about the impact of market consolidation on the
likelihood of collusion have been more prominent in recent years. In the
US this discussion is expressed as a concern about “coordinated effects”
of mergers. In Canada and in Europe the same issue is raised under the
label “joint dominance”. Especially in European merger policy, regulators
have attempted to use the joint dominance concept aggressively for blocking
mergers in such prominent - and often controversial - cases as Nestle-Perrier,
Kali und Salz, Gencor-Lonrho, and Airtours. The judgement by the Euro-
pean Court of First Instance annulling the European Commission decision
to block a merger in Airtours has clarified that “joint dominance” analysis
in European mergers has to be treated as coordinated effects analysis and
thus has to be consistent with collusion theory.1
It has, however, been difficult to find empirically sound approaches to
assessing the coordinated effects of mergers. In contrast to unilateral effects
analysis in which there exists a sophisticated set of empirical techniques to
approach the assessment of unilateral effects, no such consistent approach
exists for coordinated effects. This has remained true even after a compre-
hensive recent review of such analysis by the Department of Justice in the
US. These difficulties arise because of a fundamental difference between uni-
lateral effects and coordinated effects. For unilateral effects analysis a firm
is assumed to be short run profit maximizing before and after the merger.
This allows a simple analysis of the change of the incentives to raise prices
unilaterally after the merger. However, in coordinated effects analysis we are
interested in the degree to which firms can move away from short run profit
maximization towards monopoly pricing. This makes both the theoretical
and empirical analysis more difficult. Indeed, we are largely lacking a proper
theoretical framework that would allow us to make empirical inferences from
market data.
In this paper we attempt a systematic analysis of the issues concerning
the coordinated effects of asset transactions between firms, including merg-
ers, in the framework of a differentiated goods model. For the assessment
of coordinated effects we are interested in the mapping between asset dis-
tribution and the incentives to collude. The assets of interest in our model
are brands or varieties that are owned by a specific firm. We model col-
lusion as an infinitely repeated game. Since there is a very large set of
equilibria for such game there is no sense in which we could do compara-
1For discussions concerning the issues raised in this debate see Kühn (2002 a, b).
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tive statics for a particular equilibrium. For this reason we have to perform
comparative statics for the complete set of equilibrium outcomes (see Abreu,
Pearce, Stacchetti (1990) or Kandori (1992)). Unfortunately, such compar-
ative statics can only be done analytically when equilibrium value sets that
are generated from changing the parameters are nested. This is not the case
for our model.
We therefore proceed in two steps.We first generate some intuition for
the forces at work in the model by analyzing symmetric optimal punishment
equilibria. Then we determine the comparative statics of the full equilibrium
value set numerically for one particular example.
For symmetric optimal punishment strategies we show that the scope for
collusion is determined only by the incentives of the largest firm to deviate
from the most severe punishment price and of the smallest firm to deviate
from the most collusive price. We go on to show that asset acquisitions by
the smallest firm in the market (including mergers) will facilitate collusion
and raise the most profitable collusive price, while asset acquisitions by the
largest firm will tend to undermine collusion and lower the most profitable
collusive price. The reason is that a small firm reduces its incentive to devi-
ate from a high price by becoming bigger because the amount of demand it
wins over from a given price cut decreases when it becomes bigger relative to
the market. Conversely, a large firm will have greater difficulty to credibly
punish when it becomes larger relative to the market. Hence, the effec-
tiveness of punishments are undermined. For these reasons mergers by the
largest firm can lead to the counterintuitive result that the merger reduces
the highest achievable collusive price. Furthermore, asymmetry increasing
mergers will not be profitable in such settings because the joint profits of
the merging companies are decreased.
We then discuss the robustness of these comparative statics results rela-
tive to fully optimal punishments. For this purpose we numerically calculate
the effects of asset transfers in a duopoly model. To obtain a clear set of com-
parative statics results, we calculate the profit, price and welfare changes,
when firms select the equilibrium played using a Nash Bargaining solution
from the equilibrium value set. We show that, as predicted by the symmet-
ric optimal punishment equilibrium, profits decline as fairly symmetric firms
become more asymmetric. However, for sufficient asymmetry the increase
in asymmetry leads to profit increases as firms are exhibiting close to best
response pricing.
The comparative statics of prices are more complicated. When the
smaller firm gets smaller its prices always decline. However, the prices of the
larger firm increase starting from fairly symmetric distributions of varieties.
2
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In markets in which collusion is relatively easy, this may lead to average
prices rising above the monopoly price. Because of this effect, all prices may
fall when markets with very asymmetric asset holdings are further consoli-
dated. Under collusion the consolidation of very asymmetric markets to a
monopoly may therefore even be welfare improving.
We then explore the policy implications of the theory for merger policy.
The most important result is that firms have no interest to induce slight
asymmetries through asset transactions since this is profit reducing. This
means that asymmetry increasing mergers are unlikely to occur for market
power reasons. But there are also further lessons for policy. First, we show
that if a firm is large enough relative to the rest of the market it cannot
credibly participate in a collusive scheme. This gives new meaning to the
legal definition of a dominant firm as a firm “that can act independently
of the market”. Indeed a dominant firm in our context will not be able to
collude precisely because it always has an incentive to unilaterally keep prices
up, making it impossible to punish smaller firms for deviating from collusive
outcomes. This implies that for practical competition policy purposes single
firm dominance and multi-firm dominance should be mutually exclusive.
Similarly one can show that it always pays all firms not to include very
small firms in a collusive arrangement. This corresponds to the insight that
optimal collusion would allow a small firm to price arbitrarily close to its
short run best response, even if larger firms increase prices signifciantly
above the best response price. These two results can be taken as building
blocks for a policy rule by which joint dominance is assessed for a subset
of firms that are much larger than others and relatively similar within the
group. This justifies the focus of policy on two-firm, three-firm, or four firm
dominance in markets that may have many more firms.
We can also show that coordinated effects should not be analyzed market
by market. By arguments analogous to the analysis of the impact of multi-
market contact on collusion (see Bernheim and Whinston 1990), asymme-
tries in one market may be compensated by offsetting asymmetries in an-
other market. We give a simple example in which a merger would produce
no overlap between the firms, but where it has strong adverse coordinated
effects. Our model also allows us to analyze the persistence of dominant
or jointly dominant constellations. In static models there is a tendency for
the largest firm to be the most likely to add new products to the prod-
uct line, reinforcing single firm dominance. If firms play optimally collusive
equilibria, then smaller firms within the optimal collusive group will have
larger incentives to add a product to the product line because this reduces
the incentive problems for collusion and increases the price. Hence, joint
3
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dominance is also self reinforcing.
Previous research has done very little to provide theoretical or empirical
underpinnings for dealing with the issue of coordinated effects of mergers.
While the issue of asset transfers in mergers has been discussed for sta-
tic models in the work of Farrell and Shapiro (1990 a,b) and McAfee and
Williams (1992), asymmetries between firms in models of collusion have tra-
ditionally only been based on parametric differences in costs (Harrington
1991, Rothschild 1999) or discount factors Harrington (1989).
The first paper that discusses coordinated effects of mergers based on
asset transfers is Compte, Jenny, and Rey (2002). Their paper is inspired
by the Nestle-Perrier transaction. They look at the effects of asset transfers
and mergers in the context of collusion in a Bertrand-Edgeworth homoge-
neous goods model with capacity constraints and calibrate their model to
the data from the Nestle-Perrier case. However, their model assumes uni-
form reservation prices for all customers. For this reason optimal collusion
only occurs at the reservation price or no collusion can be sustained at all.
This excludes the possibility of meaningful price effects. Vasconcelos (2004)
re-examines the analysis of capacity transfers of Compte et al. (1992) when
cost functions are of the type in McAfee and Williams (1992) and firms set
quantities instead of prices. This paper also has no analysis of the price
effects of mergers.
Our paper in contrast deals with brands as assets. This means that we
necessarily have to work in a differentiated products model on the demand
side. While the paper is similar in spirit to Compte et al. (2002), our
setting allows us to study the price effects of mergers. Instead of focusing
the analysis on whether collusion is “more or less likely” this analysis is in
the spirit that one always has to consider the whole set of dynamic equilibria.
Therfore the more important question to ask is how collusive price change
when market structure changes. Our paper is the first paper that derives
results for the whole equilibrium set, i.e. it considers full optimal punishment
equilibria and shows that the comparative statics in price for firms that
grow larger and those that get smaller typically go in opposite directions.
This cautions against the use of variants of symmetric optimal punishment
schemes in asymmetric models. With this analysis the paper is also the
first to use computational methods to obtain comparative statics results for
changes in the collusive price for asymmetric models. We demonstrate the
practical applicability of the Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti algorithm for applied
modelling in industrial organization.
The model is introduced in section 2. Section 3 contains the main analy-
sis of the model. Section 4 presents the numerical analysis of the full equi-
4
7
Kuhn:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
librium value set. Section 5 discusses implications for merger policy. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consumer demand for n varieties of the product is given by the set of demand
functions Di(p), i = 1, ..., n, where p is the n-dimensional vector of prices.
The demand system is symmetric in prices. Individual demand is decreasing
in own price and increasing in the prices of other varieties. There arem firms
in the market, 2 ≤ m ≤ n. A firm k can produce multiple varieties, each
under the same constant marginal cost c > 0. It is characterized by its
“product line”, namely the set K of varieties it owns. We denote the length
of the product line, i.e. the number of varieties in K, by nK . The set Kc is
the set of varieties firms other than k have in their product lines. A variety
is a proprietary asset of a firm, so that no two firms can produce the same
variety, i.e. K ∩Kc = ∅ and nK +nKc = n for all K. By the assumption of
demand symmetry, firms differ only in the length of their product lines. We
denote the largest (smallest) firm in the market by k¯ (k), which produces n¯
(n) varieties.
Let pK be the nK-dimensional vector of prices of all varieties in K so
that p = (pK ,pKc). We assume that for any set of products K, the total
revenue pK ·DK(pK ,pKc) is strictly concave in pK for every pKc .2 This
assumption implies that there is a unique monopoly price pm(n) that a
monopolist controlling all n varieties would set for all varieties. We also
assume strategic complementarity and that best responses are contraction
mappings. To state this formally, letDK(pK ,pKc) be the demand for variety
i ∈ K if all products j ∈ K are priced at pK . Then assumption 1 guarantees
these properties3:
Assumption 1: For all K, demand satisfies the following proper-
ties: (i) For every nKc-vector ε > 0, ∂
2[lnDK(pK ,pKc+aε)]
∂pk∂a |a=0> 0 (strate-
gic complementarity) and (ii)
¯¯¯
∂ lnDK(pK ,pKc)
∂pK
¯¯¯
>
P
j∈Kc
∂ lnDK(pK ,pKc)
∂pj and¯¯¯
∂2 lnDK(pK ,pKc)
∂p2K
¯¯¯
>
P
j∈Kc
∂2 lnDK(pK ,pKc)
∂pk∂pj (own price effects dominate cross
price effects).
In each period all firms first observe a public signal σ ∈ [0, 1], which
2Note that by the symmetry of demand we can always relable demand for each firm K
in such a way that the first K arguments in the demand vector DK(pK ,pKc) refer to the
prices of firm K.
3 See Vives (1999) for an overview of such results.
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is not payoff relevant for that period.4 Then each firm k simultaneously
selects a price vector pK ∈ [0, P¯ ]nK , where P¯ >> pm(1), the price a mo-
nopolist in a market with only one variety would set.5 For a given pe-
riod the payoff per variety of firm k can be written as Πk(pK ,pKc) =
1
nK
P
j∈K(pj − c)Dj(pK ,pKc). By the symmetry and concavity assump-
tions on demand, the short run best response function p∗K(pKc) in the stage
game has the property that the firm sets the same price for every one of its
varieties, i.e. p∗i (pKc) = p∗j (pKc) for all i, j ∈ K. Assumption 1 implies that
this stage game has a unique Bertrand equilibrium for any distribution of
varieties across the m firms.
We analyze the set of equilibria for the infinitely repeated version of this
game. A history of the game up to time t, H(t) ∈
£
0, P¯
¤n·(t−1) × [0, 1]t−1,
includes all past prices set for all products and all past realizations of the
public signal σ. A strategy for firm K is a sequence of functions epK =
{pK(H(t), σt)}∞t=1 , pK(H(t), σt) :
£
0, P¯
¤n·(t−1) × [0, 1]t → £0, P¯ ¤nK , for all
t ≥ 1. Firms discount future profits with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The per
variety average discounted value to firm k from a given strategy profile ep is
given by
vk(ep) = (1− δ) ∞X
t=1
δt−1 1nK
E



X
j∈K
(pj(t)− c)Dj(pK(t),pKc(t))


 , (1)
where E is the expectations operator taken over future realizations of the
signal σ. We are interested in analyzing the set of per variety average value
vectors for firms, V , that can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibria in
this game. In particular, we want to analyze how the “most collusive” out-
comes of this game change as we transfer varieties from one firm to another.
Formally, this means that we want to perform a comparative statics analysis
of the Pareto frontier of the equilibrium value set and of the price vectors
that support those values. While the relevant theory for the derivation of
equilibrium value sets is well-established (see Abreu 1988; Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti 1990), it is often impossible to derive analytical results about
the equilibrium value set. In the literature such comparative statics have
4We introduce this public randomization device for purely technical reasons. It guar-
antees a convex equilibrium value set, which allows us to encompass cases in which one
period punishments cannot be made arbitrarily large as in the linear differentiated goods
model or versions of the logit model. The assumption also permits us to use the Abreu,
Pearce, Stachetti (1991) algorithm for computing equilibrium value sets.
5This is equivalent to the best response price if rivals charge infinite prices. It is an
upper bound to the price any firm would charge in the market.
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only been derived in cases in which the value sets are nested (see Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990, Kandori 1992, Kühn and Rimler 2004). This is
not the case for our analysis. We have therefore chosen a two step approach
to analyzing the problem. We first analyze the restricted set of “symmetric
optimal punishment equilibria”. This is the set of equilibria in which all
firms set the same price in their equilibrium strategies in every given period
in every continuation equilibrium of the game. We fully analyze this con-
strained set of equilibria. We then discuss the limitations of the analysis and
show numerically to what extent the basic insights carry over to unrestricted
optimal punishment schemes.
3 Asset Distributions and the Incentives to Col-
lude
3.1 Symmetric Optimal Punishment Schemes
In symmetric optimal punishment equilibria the analysis of incentives to de-
viate from the equilibrium strategy is particularly simple. We only need to
consider two prices in any period: the price pK that firm k has to decide on
and the price p that all other firms set for all other varieties according to the
proposed equilibrium strategy. We can therefore work with the simplified
profit function πk(pK , p) = (pK − c)D(pK , p, nK), where D(pK , p, nK) rep-
resents the demand where all rival varieties are priced at p and firm k sets
price pK for all its nK varieties. Since, by symmetry, πK(p, p) = πK
0
(p, p)
for all K 0 we drop the superscript for symmetric price vectors. In symmetric
optimal punishment equilibria the profits per variety are therefore the same
for all firms and all firms have the same profit ranking over the equilibrium
value set.
We now show that the set of symmetric optimal punishment equilibria
has a particularly simple characterization. Let v be the average per vari-
ety value in the lowest continuation value equilibrium and let P c be the
price charged in every period of the highest value continuation equilibrium.6
Furthermore, let p∗(p, nK) be the short run best response price of a firm
controlling the varieties in K to a price p charged by all others. Then the
incentive condition for the highest value equilibrium can be written for each
firm k as:
π(P c, P c) ≥ (1− δ)πK(p∗(P c, nK), P c, nK) + δv. (2)
6The lowest average continuation value is then given by v1−δ . This is a standard way
in the literature on repeated game to simplify notation.
7
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The average profit from complying with setting the most profitable collu-
sive price P c must exceed the average profits from obtaining best response
profits to P c for one period and then reverting to the lowest value continu-
ation equilibrium. The incentive condition for the worst equilibrium can be
written for each firm k as
v ≥ (1− δ)πK(p∗(pL, nK), pL, nK) + δv, (3)
where sticking to pL in the first period in which punishment is triggered
and obtaining v must be more profitable than optimally deviating from
pL and restarting punishment at continuation value v. Without loss of
generality we can decompose v into the profits from charging pL in the
first period and then obtaining some continuation value vˆ in the future:
v ≡ (1− δ)π(pL, pL) + δvˆ. We then have a very simple characterization of
optimal punishment strategies:
Lemma 1 The incentive constraint for the lowest value equilibrium is al-
ways binding for at least one firm k. Generically, we have either vˆ =
π(P c, P c) and pL > 0 or v < vˆ < π(P c, P c) and pL = 0 for that firm.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To see the basic argument suppose that pL > 0 and vˆ < π(P c, P c). For
any given v we can then generate the same value by using a lower pL and
a higher vˆ. The incentive constraint for P c is not affected, but incentive
constraint (3) would be strictly relaxed because, by the envelope theorem,
π(p∗(pL), pL) strictly increases in pL. However, this would contradict the
assertion that v is the lowest equilibrium value. This implies that all optimal
punishments are always maximally front loaded: optimal collusion requires
to generate v by punishing with the lowest feasible pL in the period after a
deviation.7
To sustain any price p in a given period in a symmetric optimal punish-
ment equilibrium, the incentive to deviate,
φK(p∗(p, nK), p, nK) ≡ πK(p∗(p, nK), p, nK)− π(p, p), (4)
has to be smaller than the profit loss from switching from the best collusive
equilibrium with per period profits π(P c, P c) for ever to an equilbirium
with the worst average continuation value of v = (1− δ)π(pL, pL)+ δvˆ. The
7The property pL > 0 is always guaranteed under the assumption limp→0D(p, p) =∞,
which holds when the marginal utility of consumers at zero consumption is strictly positive.
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incentive compatibility conditions for each firm K for sustaining the highest
and the lowest possible collusive price can then be rewritten as:
φK(p∗(P c, nK), P c, nK) ≤ δ
1− δ [π(P
c, P c)− v] (5)
and:
φK(p∗(pL, nK), pL, nK) ≤ δ[vˆ − π(pL, pL)], (6)
where vˆ = π(P c, P c) if pL > 0 and vˆ < π(P c, P c) otherwise. The incentive
constraint (6) must be an equality for the firm k with the greatest incen-
tive to deviate φK(p∗(pL, nK), pL, nK) by Lemma 1. Similarly (5) must be
binding for the firm with the largest incentive to deviate from that price
whenever P c < pm(n). Note that only the incentives to deviate φK are
affected by the relative length of the product line in our model, namely
through the properties of the short run best response function. In the next
subsection we characterize the incentives to deviate before we present our
main results in the following subsection.
3.2 Firm Size and the Incentives to Deviate from Collusion
The difference in the length of the product line only affects the incentives to
deviate φK(p∗(p, nK), p, nK) for any given price p firms may want to sustain.
The incentives for deviation from the prices P c and pL will therefore depend
primarily on the properties of the short run best responses p∗(p, nK) for any
firmK. These properties follow directly from the assumption of strategic
complementarity and the fact that the best response function of firm K is
a contraction:
Lemma 2 The best response price p∗(p, nK) is strictly increasing in p (when-
ever D(p∗(p, nK), p, nK) > 0), pm > p∗(pm, nK), and p∗(c, nK) > c. For
each nK there exists a unique price pˆ(nK) > c such that p∗(pˆ(nK), nK) =
pˆ(nK). It is strictly increasing in nK.
Proof. See the Appendix.
By strategic complementarity, the higher the prices of competitors are,
the higher a price the firm will charge. The boundary properties of the best
response function are also obvious from our assumptions but important to
note here: First, if the prices of competitors are too high the firm has an
incentive to undercut rivals. If the prices are too low, then it will have an
incentive to charge a higher price. The uniqueness of pˆ(nˆ) then follows triv-
ially from the assumption that own effects dominate cross effects in demand
9
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so that best response functions are contraction mappings. The result that
the price pˆ(n) is increasing in n is also based on simple intuition: The larger
the firm the more pricing externalities between products the firm takes into
account and the less aggressive its pricing policy is.
The previous Lemma allows a simple characterization of the short run
gains from undercutting at the best response prices that will be central to
the characterization of optimal symmetric punishment schemes:
Lemma 3 Suppose nK > nK0, then
(a) φK(p∗(p, nK), p, nK) > φK0(p∗(p, nK0), p, nK), if p < pˆ(nK0) and
(b) φK(p∗(p, nK), p) < φK0(p∗(p, nK), p), if p > pˆ(nK).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 describes the short run incentives of firms to deviate from
a common symmetric price across all firms and varieties. This incentive
depends on the level of the price p. At high levels of the price p all firms
have an incentive to deviate to a lower price. However, the incentives of
a small firm to cut the price are larger than the incentives of a large firm.
The small firm gains customers from more varieties than the large firm does
and therefore generates a larger quantity effect from a price decrease from
a given price cut than a larger firm does. For exactly the same reason this
situation is reversed when the price is sufficiently low so that all firms have
an incentive to unilaterally raise the price above p. The larger firm loses
proportionately less demand to rivals from a price increase than a smaller
rival so that the profits per variety are higher when a large firm raises the
price should it be pricing below its best response price.
However, for a complete description of the incentives to deviate we also
have to consider the possibility that P c or pL are in the range (n, n¯). In this
case some firms have incentives to deviate upwards and some downwards.
We show in our first proposition that this slight complication does not ma-
terially affect the basic insight that only two incentive constraints matter for
our later analysis: that of the smallest firm to stick to the most profitable
sustainable collusive price P c and that of the largest firm to stick to the
optimal punishment price pL:
Proposition 1 In any symmetric optimal punishment equilibrium: (a) the
smallest firm k always has the largest incentive to deviate from the most
profitable collusive price P c(δ), and (b) the largest firm k¯ has the greatest
incentive to deviate from the optimal punishment price pL.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10
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Proposition 1 captures the fact that a collusive price maintained by all
firms must always relax competition relative to the firm that has the largest
incentives to undercut in the short run. In our model it is the small firm that
always has a greater potential to capture customers from other firms when
deviating from the collusive price. The smallest firm is, in our model, the
firm with the smallest degree of market power, since it controls the smallest
number of varieties in the market. As a result, it also has the smallest
incentive to contribute to the public good of raising prices.
For exactly symmetric reasons, the incentives to deviate are exactly re-
versed when the equilibrium calls for punishments. Now the largest firm has
the greatest incentive to deviate from the punishment strategy. The reason
is that in the short run it can make the highest profits by deviating to a
higher price exploiting its market power. The large firm can extract more
rent from consumers because it controls a larger share of varieties internal-
izing more externalities in price setting. It therefore has to give up more
rent per variety than smaller competitors when agreeing to comply with a
punishment strategy.
In any optimal punishment equilibrium some firm must have an incentive
to raise the price in the short run, otherwise the punishment could be made
more severe without violating incentive constraints. But then the firm that
has the largest incentives to raise prices will be the one that will put a limit
on the severity of equilibrium punishments. This is in our case the largest
firm. In our model a larger firm has more market power in the sense of
controlling more varieties, and as a consequence has a greater incentive to
raise prices. The difficulty for collusion that arises from the presence of a
large firm is that such a firm cannot as credibly threaten smaller firms to
punish them for deviations from collusion. Punishment is much more costly
for a large firm than for a small firm. It is precisely the market power of the
large firm that undermines its ability to collude with a small firm.
Note that these results appear to be in stark contrast to those of Compte
et al. (2002) on homogeneous goods markets with capacity constraints. In
their model a large firm has the largest incentive to deviate from collusion,
while small firms have smaller ability to credibly punish the larger firm. The
reason is that large firms have large incentives to fill capacity, giving them
greater incentives to undercut the collusive price. On the other hand, small
firms are capacity constrained and cannot credibly drop the price as much as
the large firm in a punishment period. Our results are driven by the opposite
incentive structure. They indicate that it depends very much on the assets
under consideration which incentive problem is more important for the large
or the small firms. However, as we show below the policy implications for
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the analysis of assets transfers as in mergers and remedies based on asset
sales will still be very similar.
3.3 The Scope for Collusion
The results of the previous subsection have shown that the only incentive
constraints that matter for symmetric optimal punishment schemes are those
of the smallest firm not to deviate from the optimal collusive price and of
the largest firm not to deviate from the optimal punishment price. In this
subsection we characterize first characterize the optimal collusive price for
every δ, P c(δ). On the basis of this characterization result we can discuss
in the following subsection how asset transfers and asset acquisitions change
the maximally collusive price and the overall scope for collusion.
In an optimal symmetric punishment equilibrium the highest profit equi-
librium is obtained by charging P c(δ) until some firm deviates from that
price. After any deviation in some period firms charge pL in the next pe-
riod and then obtain an average continuation value vˆ ≤ π(P c(δ), P c(δ)) in
the following period. A direct approach to this problem would therefore be
to fix δ and find the most profitable P c(δ) achievable under the incentive
constraints by adjusting pL (and vˆ). It turns out to be easier to look at
a dual problem: Fix some pricepc, pˆ(nK) ≤ pc ≤ pm, to be charged when
no deviation has occured and search for the lowest δ, denoted as δ¯(pc), for
which this price is sustainable under the relevant incentive constraints by
adjusting pL (and vˆ ≤ π(pc, pc), where vˆ = π(pc, pc) ⇐⇒ pc > 0). The
relevant incentive constraints are given by (5) and (6) where pc replaces P c.
The highest pc ≤ pm that is just sustainable at δ¯ is P c(δ¯).
As we have shown in proposition 1 we only need to focus on the incen-
tive condition (5) for the smallest firm and the incentive condition (6) for
the largest firm. Rewrite (5) by substituting v = πK¯(p∗(pL, nK¯), pL, nK¯)
as φK = δ1−δ [π(pc, pc) − πK¯(p∗(pL, nK¯), pL, nK¯)]. The locus of this con-
straint in (pL, δ) space for a given price pc, denoted by pKL (δ), is plotted
as the monotonically increasing schedule in Figure 1. Clearly, as δ →
1, incentive constraint (5) is just binding in the limit only if π(pc, pc) −
πK¯(p∗(pL, nK¯), pL, nK¯) → 0, so that that limδ→1 p
K
L (δ) ∈ [pˆ(n), pc) in the
limit. As δ is decreased the punishment price has to decrease to leave firm
K indifferent between charging the collusive price or deviating to the short
run best response. Clearly, there will be some δ > 0 at which the pL = 0 in
order to just make firm K indifferent between charging pc and deviating to
a best response. For lower δ no collusion is feasible. For all combinations of
δ and pL to the right and below pKL (δ) no firm has an incentive to deviate
12
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Figure 1:
from pc, for combinations of δ and pL to the left and above this schedule pc
cannot be sustained.
Now consider the severest punishment that can be undertaken so that
the largest firm K¯ is still willing to charge the punishment price instead
of deviating to a higher price. Consider the schedule generated by φK¯ =
δ[π(pc, pc) − π(pL, pL). This is represented by the non-monotonic schedule
pK¯L (δ) in figure 2. At δ = 0 the only sustainable price is the fixed point in
the largest firm’s best response function pˆ(n¯). By Lemma 3 we know that
the punishment price has to fall strictly below pˆ(n¯), so that pK¯L (δ) must
be initially falling close to δ = 0.8 In contrast, it can be shown that for
δ close enough to 1, pK¯L (δ) must be arbitrarily close to 0. In Figure 2 we
have drawn a case in which pK¯L (δ) = 0 for some δ < 0. For preferences with
strictly positive marginal utility at zero pK¯L (δ) approaches zero as δ goes to
1. Note that for all combinations of δ and pL below and to the left of pK¯L (δ)
no collusion can be sustained.
We now show that if the schedules pK¯(δ) and pKL (δ) intersect there is
only one intersection, which determines the lowest δ at which pc can be
8 Indeed, It can be shown that pK¯L (δ) decreases at an infinite rate at δ = 0.
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sustained, denoted by δ¯(pc). If they do not δ¯(pc) is given by the δ at which
pKL (δ) = 0. Note that any pc that can be sustained forever at δ¯(pc), can be
sustained for any higher δ as well.
Lemma 4 For every pc > c there exists a unique δ¯(pc) such that this price
can be sustained forever at a maximal punishment equilibrium if and only if
δ ≥ δ¯(pc)˙.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 shows as a dotted line the function δ¯(pc). Note that this function
does not necessarily have a unique minimum. It is perfectly possible that
there are multiple local minima of δ¯(pc) because locally reducing the price pc
may tighten the incentive constraint of the large firm more than it relaxes
the constraint of the small firm. However, we nevertheless can obtain an
unambiguous result about the change in the optimally collusive price P c(δ)
as a function of δ. We have drawn this schedule as the solid line in Figure
2.
Note that by Lemma 4 we can sustain a price pc for ever if and only if δ
is weakly above the locus δ¯(pc). But then Figure 2 allows us to read off the
most profitable collusive price P c by fixing δ and moving up in the figure.
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Either we get to a point at which pm is sustainable as a collusive price or we
get to a point on the locus δ¯(pc) such that no higher price can be sustained
at that discount factor. Note that for δ ≥ δ¯(pm), the optimally collusive
price will be pm, the monopoly price. For lower δ, P c(δ) will increase in δ,
with the possibility of upward jumps to local minima of the function δ¯(pc).
The next proposition states this result formally:
Proposition 2 There exists δ and δ¯(pm) with 0 < δ < δ¯(pm) < 1 such that
there exists an optimal symmetric punishment equilibrium if and only if δ ∈
[δ, 1]. The optimal collusive price P c(δ) is equal to pm for all δ ∈ [δ¯(pm), 1]
and it is strictly increasing on δ ∈ [δ, δ¯(pm)], piecewise continuous with at
most a finite number of upward jumps. The optimal punishment price PL(δ)
is strictly decreasing in δ on δ ∈ [δ, 1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 gives the intuitive result that the optimally collusive price
will fall as δ is decreased. It gets harder to give the small firm incentives
not to deviate from a high collusive price and at the same time it gets
more difficult to make the large firm enforce harsh punishments on a small
deviating firm. This intuitive monotonic relationship between the price level
and δ, the parameter that measures the ease of collusion, is a nice property
of our model that allows us to study the price effects of asset transactions,
something that is not possible in the model of Compte et al.(2002).
3.4 The Impact of Asset Transfers and Mergers on the Op-
timal Collusive Price
We can now state the central results in the paper that characterize the ef-
fect of asset transfers and mergers on the optimal collusive outcome. In this
model we will not only obtain results on the change in the range of dis-
count factors for which some collusion is sustainable at a symmetric optimal
punishment equilibrium, but also obtain insights into the direction of price
changes in the highest profit equilibrium that result from the asset transfers.
Nevertheless, we will start with the more traditional question whether the
range of discount factors for which some degree of collusion can be sustained
changes with the distribution of varieties among the firms.
This question comes down to a comparative statics exercise on δ. In-
tuitively, asset transactions should only matter if they change the size of
the largest or smallest firm in the industry. If the largest firm increases the
number of varieties leaving the number of varieties owned by the smallest
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firm unchanged, then the largest firm has less of an incentive for punish-
ments and δ increases. Conversely , if the size of the smallest firm increases,
it will have less of an incentive to cut the price and hence, collusion will be
sustainable even at a lower δ. To make this argument formal let κ1 and κ2
be the capacity distributions before and after the transaction respectively
and define δ(κl) as the lowest discount factor at which some collusion is
sustainable for asset distribution κl. Then we have:
Proposition 3 (a) Suppose that K is the same under κ1 and κ2. Then
δ(κ1) > δ(κ2) if and only if K¯1 > K¯2.
(b) Suppose that K¯ is the same under κ1 and κ2. Then δ(κ1) > δ(κ2) if
and only if K1 < K2.
(c) If both K and K¯ are the same under κ1 and κ2, then δ(κ1) = δ(κ2)
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition shows that increases in the size of the largest firm will
make collusion more difficult to sustain in the market, while increases in the
size of the smallest firm will make it easier to sustain collusive outcomes.
This should be expected from our basic intuition.
However, we can now go one step further and show how asset transac-
tions impact on the most profitable collusive prices that are sustainable for
any given discount factor. This is the more important comparative static
since there is no reason to believe that discount factors should change as
a result of a merger. Obviously, a comparison of the most collusive prices
under two asset distributions only makes sense when before and after the
transaction some collusion was feasible in the industry. Similarly, there will
be no impact on the price if the monopoly price can be sustained before
and after the transaction. To limit our discussion to the relevant range of
discount factors, define δmax ≡ max{δ(κ1), δ(κ2)} as the lowest discount
factor for which collusion can be sustained both before and after the asset
transaction. Similarly, let δ¯(pm, κ) be the be the lowest discount factor for
which the monopoly price can be sustained under asset distribution κ and
define δ¯min ≡ min{δ¯(pm, κ1), δ¯(pm, κ2)}. We are interested in the range of
discount factors δ ∈ (δmax, δ¯min).
To gain intuition let us start with asset transactions that do not change
the size ranking of the largest and smallest firms. Consider first asset ac-
quisitions by the largest firm K¯ from other firms than the smallest firm,
leaving the identity of the smallest firm unchanged. This means the incen-
tive constraint for the smallest firm is unchanged. However, the increase in
the number of varieties offered by K¯ will tighten its incentive constraint on
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complying with punishments for deviations. If, for a given δ ≤ δ¯(pm), the
price under the original distribution is still to be sustained as a collusive
price, the lowest punishment price sustainable must be increased. This im-
plies that P c(κ1) cannot be sustained anymore (and also any higher price
that would be closer to the monopoly price). Hence the highest sustain-
able price in a symmetric optimal punishment equilibrium must go down as
the size of the largest firm is increased and the size of the smallest firm is
unchanged.9
The argument is exactly reversed if the smallest firm increases its product
line by buying varieties from other firms, leaving the size of the largest
firm unchanged and leaving the identity of the smallest firm unchanged.
As the product line is increased, the incentive constraint at the previous
optimal collusive price will be relaxed for the smallest firm. Hence, the
optimal collusive price can be increased leading to higher profits. The next
proposition states these results more formally:
Proposition 4 Consider a transaction that changes the distribution of va-
rieties in the market from κ1 to κ2 and fix δ ∈ [δmax, δ¯min). Then:
(a) If K¯1 < K¯2 and K1 = K2 then P c(δ, κ1) > P c(δ, κ2).
(b) If K1 < K2 and K¯1 = K¯2 then P c(δ, κ1) < P c(δ, κ2)
(c) Among all redistributions of assets between two firms, those from the
largest to the smallest firm will increase P c most, as long as these do not
make the previously smallest firm into the largest firm.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the comparative statics that proposition 4 derives for the
most profitable collusive price between two different asset distributions holds
equally for the change in profits per variety. Hence, asset transactions that
would tighten the collusive constraint would be unprofitable under the as-
sumption that the most collusive outcome could be obtained. This is the
case because then there would be no possible deal between two firms that
could increase their joint profits through the transaction if the most prof-
itable collusive price were to fall as a result.
9The basic idea of the argument can also be seen by looking at Figures 1 and 2 above.
If the largest firm gets larger the locus of the binding constraint for the large firm moves
up in Figure 1. This means that for any pc the lowest δ at which it is sustainable, δ¯(pc) is
increased. Since this holds for any pc this means that the schedule δ¯(pc) in Figure 2 simply
moves to the right. But then the highest sustainable price before the asset transaction
cannot be sustainable anymore (and no prices that were previously not sustainable can
now be). Hence, the highest sustainable price has to go down.
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Clearly, in our setting only the incentives of the largest and the smallest
firm matter for determining the comparative statics effects. This does not
mean that the result in proposition 4 requires that the identity of the largest
or smallest firm is unchanged. For example, if the largest firm sells varieties
it may become smaller than the previously second largest firm. Proposition
4 still holds, but with the identity of the largest firm changed between the
two distributions of assets considered. Note, that proposition 4 implies that
under unconstrained trading of varieties, firms should trade up to the point
where all own the same number of varieties.
What proposition 4 does not consider is the case of a firm that sells all
of its varieties. The reason is that a firm that has no varieties is not a small
firm, but one that has exits the market. For example, if the smallest firm
in the market sells all its varieties to the largest firm, the second smallest
remaining firm has to be considered the smallest firm under the new asset
distribution. This is obviously the relevant case when considering mergers.
Given this slight modification the result of proposition 4 can be directly
translated into a result about mergers;
Proposition 5 If the smallest firm merges with any other firm than the
largest firm, the highest sustainable price strictly increases. If the largest
firm merges with any other than the smallest firm, the highest sustainable
price falls. Mergers of the largest firm with the smallest firm are more likely
to decrease prices the smaller the second smallest firm.
Proof. Follows directly from proposition 4.
The fact that mergers of the largest firm tend to depress prices in the
market may at first appear counterintuitive given standard assessments of
mergers. Why would market performance improve when the largest firm gets
larger? And why does this result not imply that full monopolization leads
to the best outcome? The error in this type of reasoning stems from the
fact that we usually think about mergers in terms of single firm dominance
or the unilateral effects of the merger. In unilateral effects analysis a firm
that increases its product line will always gain in market power and has
an incentive to raise the price unilaterally. However, our analysis is about
the impact of mergers on the incentives to jointly raise prices. As long as
collusion is feasible an increase in the heterogeneity between firms will make
collusion more difficult and consequently lower the highest sustainable prices
in models with product differentiation. This does not mean that any merger
of the largest firm will lead to lower prices. If the firm gets so large that
collusion is not sustainable, any further increase in its share of the varieties
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in the market will lead to increased market power and higher prices because
now unilateral effects determine the market price.
This analysis therefore suggests that there is a sharp distinction in
merger analysis between markets in which single firm dominance matters
and markets in which joint dominance is the primary concern. What we
have shown is that the comparative statics of asset transfers go in opposite
directions, so that decision rules on mergers and on potential remedies will
have to condition on a finding of joint or single firm dominance. In other
words, it is essential for the merger policy to determine whether unilateral
or coordinated effects determine the price setting in the market. We will
develop this theme more formally in section 5. Before we will analyze more
carefully which of the conclusions of this section can be expected to carry
over when analyzing the complete equilibrium set, dropping the restriction
to symmetric strategies.
4 Fully Optimal Punishment Schemes
The symmetric optimal punishment equilibria analyzed in the previous sec-
tion are, of course, only a selection from the overall set of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria of the repeated price game between firms in the market.
They will only give insights into the comparative statics of collusion if they
qualitatively capture the changes in the equilibrium value set and the associ-
ated set of sustainable prices. Kühn and Rimler (2004) have shown this will
typically be the case for symmetric games.10 However, they also show that
for asymmetric games the analysis of the comparative statics of symmetric
optimal punishment equilibria can be misleading. To see the problem in the
context of our model, notice that the only way that incentive constraints for
collusion can be relaxed is by reducing the highest symmetric collusive price
and increasing the lowest available symmetric punishment price. Since re-
allocations of products between firms that increase asymmetries tighten the
relevant incentive constraints, the highest sustainable price in a symmetric
optimal punishment equilibrium must fall when asymmetries increase. How-
ever, it is questionable whether this would be the case for subgame perfect
equilibria that are Pareto optimal among the set of firms. Consider, for
example, the smallest firm getting smaller through a transfer of a product
to the ownership of a larger firm. The small firm now has a larger incentive
10For a more systematic discussion of the relationship between the comparative statics
of the equilibrium value set and rerstricted equilibrium value sets see the discussion in
Kühn and Rimler (2004).
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to deviate from any given collusive price. Instead of relaxing the incen-
tive constraint by reducing all prices (and leaving market shares constant),
the incentive constraint of the smaller firm could be relaxed by allowing it
to charge a lower price than the other colluding firms. Indeed, one may
expect that the highest industry profits from collusion could be obtained
when the smallest firm reduces the price and the largest firms increases its
price. This could generate the same effect on the incentive compatibility
constraints, but at higher average prices. Our results on the price reducing
effects of asymmetry increasing mergers may, therefore, be misleading.
For this reason we extend, in this section, the analysis of our model to
the full equilibrium value set. However, this analysis cannot be done ana-
lytically since the equilibrium value sets for different distributions of assets
across firms are not nested in our model. We, therefore, limit ourselves to
a numerical analysis using the Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti algorithm for deter-
mining the equilibrium value set (see Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1991).
For computational reasons we also limit the analysis to asset reallocations
in a duopoly. This procedure allows us to compute the full comparative
statics of the equilibrium value set as we change the distribution of varieties
between the two firms. We can show that for sufficient asymmetry the value
sets are nested and the Pareto frontier of the value set unambiguously shifts
outwards. However, around symmetry the value sets are not nested. It is
then more difficult to interpret the comparative statics of collusion both with
respect to profits and prices. However, as discussed by Kühn and Rimler
(2004) one can construct consistent comparative statics results by assuming
a method of selecting the equilibrium played through a method that is con-
sistent across asset distributions. In particular, we consider the equilibrium
that would be selected by a Nash bargaining solution over the equilibrium
value set. This selection is consistent across different parametrizations of
the problem and well established in the literature for modelling contexts in
which it is important to generate a unique selection from the equilibrium
value set.11 We will now discuss the numerical setup and then show an
example for the results.
11See Jehiel (1992) for an example in which this assumption is made to evaluate the
impact of investment decisions on later collusion. In the context of the analysis of renego-
tiation proof equilibria Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (2003) use the same selection device
to generate unique renegotiation proof equilibrium value sets.
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4.1 The numerical setup
For this numerical computation we use the quadratic utility function:
U(q) = a
X
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qi −
1
2
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Whenever there is positive demand for all varieties at price vector p, the
associated demand function for variety i is:
Di(p) =
1
n [a− pi − φ(pi − p)]
where p = 1n
P
i pi is the average of all prices of varieties in the market.
At such a price vector p, the average price p is a sufficient statistic for the
overall level of the market price and there is a well defined aggregate demand
given by: X
i
Di(p) = a− p
Note that for general punishment equilibria we not only have to allow for
different firms setting different prices, but also for each firm setting different
prices for each one of its products. This could be quite inconvenient for
numerical analysis. Increasing the number of varieties increases the dimen-
sionality of the price set to be considered and therefore could considerably
lengthen the time to convergence of the algorithm. Fortunately, it turns
out that, for the linear model, the equilibrium value set generated when
restricting firms to price all varieties at the same price is the same as the
one generated when there is no such restriction:
Lemma 5 Suppose that pKL 6= 0 for all K. Then the equilibrium value set
of the full game under quadratic preferences is the same as the equilibrium
value set of a game in which the firms are restricted to charging the same
price on each variety they control.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This Lemma reduces the duopoly problem we want to calculate to a
more standard asymmetric duopoly with a one dimensional strategy for each
firm. We can change the degree of asymmetry parametrically to calculate
the impact of asymmetries on the Pareto frontier of the equilibrium value
set. The impact of the length of the product line enters the model only in
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terms of the share of the product line, so that we do not have to worry about
the effects of total varieties available.
To implement the algorithm of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1991),
we have to resort to a discrete price grid instead of the continuous strategy
space we have assumed in the theoretical part of the paper. We select a
feasible strategy set for each firm of 400 equally distanced prices between 0
and a. The set of potential price vectors P0 is a set of 400×400 price pairs.
We also select a convex set of candidate average continuation values that
is known to contain the equilibrium average value set. Denote the convex
hull of this set by H0. The algorithm maps pairs of candidate price sets and
candidate average continuation value sets (Pτ ,Hτ ) to another pair of such
sets (Pτ+1,Hτ+1). It proceeds as follows: For every price vector p ∈ Pτ we
check whether the vector satisfies the incentive constraints for some selection
of possible continuation values from Hτ .12 Note that for each price vector
we can choose different continuation value vectors depending on whether
the firms have charged p or, otherwise, which firm deviated from the price
vector. If the price vector cannot be sustained by any combination of feasible
values in Hτ , it is eliminated from Pτ+1. If it can be sustained it is included
in Pτ+1. Furthermore, for every pair of continuation values v ∈Hτ for which
the price vector can be sustained we calculate (1− δ)π(p,p) + δviτ for each
firm i. All vectors resulting from this for all price pairs are recorded in a set
Vτ+1. The set Hτ+1 is the convex hull of Vτ+1. By theorem 5 in Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) this algorithm converges to the equilibrium
value set. Since the average per variety profit of any firm can never exceed
the per variety profits of a monopolist and since firms can always guarantee
themselves at least zero profits, we choose H0 as the set of all average per
variety profits that are non-negative and in which the average profits across
all varieties are no larger than the monopoly profits. Note that for any value
pair on the Pareto frontier of the (average) equilibrium value set there is a
unique price that generates this value pair.
4.2 Numerical Results
We have run this algorithm for a number of different parameterizations. For
all parametrizations the qualitative outcome is the same. We present here
results for a single parametrization with a = 100, c = 40, φ = 1, and δ = 13 .
12We limit the search to the convex hull of the set of average continuation values since
any price vector that can be sustained by appropriate continuation values strictly in the
set can also be sustained by values on the convex hull of the equilibrium value set. See
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1991).
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We construct the maximal average continuation value for all products from
the per variety monopoly profit given by maxp(p−c)(a−p) =
¡a−c
2
¢2
= 900.
For this example, we have fully calculated the equilibrium average value sets
and the associated price sets. We have performed comparative statics in
changing the distribution of varieties between the firms. It shows that the
Pareto frontier of the value set is not ordered in the distribution of varieties
when distributions are relatively symmetric. However, for very asymmetric
distributions it monotonically moves towards more profitable outcomes. To
get more concrete insights into the comparative statics we then selected, for
each distribution of varieties, the equilibrium that is the outcome of Nash
bargaining over the equilibrium value set. The Nash bargaining solution
takes the one shot Nash equilibrium played forever as the threat point. We
will call this the Nash bargaining solution to the collusion problem.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the comparative statics of the Nash bargaining
solution to the collusion problem both for prices and equilibrium value sets as
we increase the proportion of varieties controlled by firm 1. The discreteness
of prices matters for the computational results. Generically, the incentive
constraints will not hold with equality for any firm given the discreteness
of the strategy space. For a small change in relative size it may therefore
be the case that the same prices will still satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraints of the firms. This induces the flat portions in the graph for
prices. We have verified that graphs do indeed get smoother as we make the
grid size finer, but required computer time rises very fast in the number of
prices considered.
Note also, that the incentive constraint for the larger firm is typically
not binding when setting the collusive price for the equilibrium chosen by
the Nash bargaining solution. However, for the smaller firm this constraint
is binding. Indeed, for any fixed incentives from future profits the collusive
price of the smaller firm must be adjusted downward towards its best re-
sponse price. This will guarantee that the collusive price for the smaller firm
must fall. Since the price that the larger firm sets in the collusive equilib-
rium is essentially not constrained, it will tend to rise around the symmetric
outcome in order to reduce the degree to which the price of the smaller firm
has to fall. While this gives the smaller firm greater market share this is
compensated by a higher price level overall from the point of view of the
firms.
Figure 3 confirms this intuition. Optimal collusion always involves the
smaller firm setting a lower price than the larger firm. The tightening of
incentive constraints due to more asymmetric distributions of varieties across
firms lead to the smaller firm reducing the price. But the larger firm does
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Prices from Nash Bargaining Solution
Linear Demand (a=100, b=1, c=40, phi=1)
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not just reduce the price by less but even increases the price. We have
chosen the discount factor in this example such that full collusion is just
possible at a symmetric allocation of varieties. As a result, the optimal
collusive scheme selected by Nash bargaining will make the larger firm charge
a price exceeding the monopoly price as soon as the asymmetry is large
enough. Note that the average price charged in the market initially slightly
falls because the price of the smaller firm falls faster than the price of the
larger firm increases. But since the price effect of the larger firm has more
weight over all purchases, the average price soon starts to increase above
the monopoly price as well. It is therefore not the case that all prices in
the market should be expected to decrease from an asymmetry increasing
merger close to symmetry.
However, note also that both prices do decrease when very asymmetric
distributions of assets get even more asymmetric. Indeed, this would indi-
cate that if firm 1 already owns 90% of the varieties in the market, a move
to complete monopolization welfare dominates the very asymmetric duopoly
market structure. Figure 4 shows that this is indeed the case when we look at
welfare:Welfare initially slightly increases but then rapidly falls. However,
once the market is sufficiently concentrated full monopolization increases
welfare because the monopolist does not keep prices above the monopoly
price anymore in order to give the small firm greater incentives to collude.
This is a result that could not be obtained with symmetric optimal pun-
ishment schemes and shows that the restriction to symmetry significantly
affects the comparative statics of prices - even qualitatively. Not all para-
metrizations of the problem will have the property that all prices will fall
from a merger to monopoly when firms are sufficiently asymmetric. If the
highest collusive price under symmetry is sufficiently below the monopoly
price, we expect to see the large firm’s price always to increase. Overall,
one should note, however, that the price effects of the asset transactions are
small as long as full collusion is achievable for a symmetric distribution of
varieties.
While the comparative statics of equilibrium prices yield a picture that
suggests that policy rules are hard to obtain from such analysis, a focus on
the comparative statics of equilibrium values suggests otherwise.
Figure 5 shows that the conclusions of our analysis of symmetric optimal
punishment equilibria do hold qualitatively when we look at profits. The
profits per variety of the larger firm decrease over a wide range of distri-
butions of varieties between the firms. Only when the asymmetry is large
enough does the further increase in varieties held by the largest firm lead
to profits increasing. This simply reflects the fact that collusive prices are
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then close to best response prices so that the profits move essentially in the
same direction as Nash profits when asymmetry is increased.
Note that over a very wide range average profits across all varieties go
down when the smaller firm sells a variety to a larger firm. This implies that
asymmetry increasing asset transactions are not profitable unless the asym-
metry is already large. This would create a presumption that asymmetry
increasing asset transaction in markets that were previously fairly symmetric
would likely have some efficiency effects that justify them when it is believed
that collusive outcomes are achieved. These transactions cannot generate a
presumption that the goal is to facilitate collusion in the post-merger mar-
ket situation. Interestingly, joint profits per variety only increase in this
example when welfare is increasing in further consolidation as well. Hence,
conditional on the firms always achieving a Nash Bargaining solution over
the equilibrium value set, the only mergers observed aer welfare improving.
5 Applying Coordinated Effects Theory toMerger
Analysis
In this section we discuss how the framework developed in this paper can
be used to derive rules for the treatment of coordinated effects in merger
analysis. There are three issues we will deal with. First there is the question
whether coordinated effects and unilateral effects should ever be found at
the same time. In anti-trust regimes like those of Canada or Europe this
should be considered the same as asking the question whether single firm
dominance or joint dominance could be present at the same time. Secondly,
we will show that new issues arise in the assessment of coordinated effects
when there are mergers involving firms operating in two separate markets.
Finally, we show that there is a tendency for joint dominance to persist so
that intervention in merger proceedings is a relevant concern.
5.1 The Conflict between Dominance and Joint Dominance
For practical purposes there are two important questions for merger analysis
that we have not addressed. First, we ask: is it sensible to find both joint
dominance and single firm dominance at the same time in a merger proceed-
ing? We will show below that there is a precise sense in our model in which
joint and single firm dominance are mutually exclusive. A closely related
question is how to interpret the above theory in practice. In real markets the
smallest firms are virtually never involved in collusive agreements and the
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concern is mostly about coordination of behavior between the largest firms
in the industry. However, the analysis of symmetric optimal punishment
strategies seems to suggest that the incentives of the very smallest firm in
an industry are crucial for merger analysis. We resolve this issue below by
showing that there are good reasons to believe that joint dominance analysis
should be applied to a subset of firms.
First note that collusion essentially disappears in our model when firms
are sufficiently asymmetric13: under fully optimal punishment equilibria
both the large firm and the small firm converge to pricing arbitrarily close
to their short run best response. Note that this does not arise because one
of the firms becomes very small relative to the rest of the market. To see
this, consider a limit of our model with an arbitrary number of varieties each
owned by a different firm. In that context every firm becomes arbitrarily
small relative to the market and a monopolistically competitive equilibrium
arises as the Nash equilibrium of the one shot game. As Green (1980) has
shown, collusion is still feasible at some discount factor strictly below 1. Al-
though each firm in a one shot equilibrium perceives no impact on the profits
of others it will consider its behavior pivotal for triggering a switch from a
collusive outcome to a monopolistically competitive outcome. Collusion can
therefore still be sustained for some discount factors in our model even if all
firms are arbitrarily small relative to the market.
What limits collusion under very asymmetric distributions of varieties
between firms is the market power of the largest firm. When a firm owns
most of the varieties it can never be made to punish very harshly. Since a
very small proportion of varieties have very small impact on the large firm’s
profits the gain from giving a small firm incentives to stick to a collusive
price are very small. However, in order to induce strong punishments there
has to be a large price reduction. This becomes very costly to a large firm.
As a result, a large firm has to price close to its best response price whatever
the remaining firms do. Indeed, when the firm is large this will be close to
the monopoly price. In turn this means that the small firm will face very
small differences between collusive and punishment prices of its rival and
charge a price very close to its best response price as well.
Note that this comes very close to the way lawyers define “single firm
dominance”, namely pricing behavior that is essentially independent of the
13For symmetric optimal punishment equilibria this can be shown to hold exactly for a
wide class of product differentiation models. We have omitted this result from this paper
because it is an artefact of restricting equilibrium strategies to be symmetric. In general a
small amount of collusion in the sense of raising the lowest price above the best response
price is always achievable in general optimal punishment schemes.
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pricing behavior of smaller firms in the market. But note that it is pre-
cisely the market dominance that makes it impossible to keep smaller firms
from raising prices significantly above the (monopolistically) competitive
outcome. That means dominance precludes significant collusion or joint
dominance. This is the precise sense in which in our model single firm
dominance and joint dominance are mutually exclusive.
Unfortunately, our example in the previous section shows that the com-
parative statics of behavior may still depend on whether firms are colluding
or not. When firms do not collude, the price charged by the largest firm
would unambiguously rise under the linear demand model discussed in the
previous section. However, it decrease under the same circumstances in our
example. The comparative statics of prices due to asset transactions under
joint dominance therefore do not necessarily coincide with the comparative
statics in the absence of collusion - even in cases in which the actual market
behavior is indistinguishable from non-collusive behavior.
A closely related problem is the question of how to treat coordinated
effects in practice for markets in which there are a few very large firms and
a significant number of very small firms. Should joint dominance analysis
focus on the large firms only or should it include all firms in the market?
We now show for symmetric optimal punishment equilibria that there
is a precise sense in which a large enough subset of firms would have an
incentive to act independently of other, smaller firms, in the market. We
show that larger firms have an incentive to drop small firms from the collu-
sive agreement when the small firm is small enough relative to the market.
This shows that only the largest firms would have an incentive to form a
collusive agreement suggesting that joint dominance or coordinated effects
of mergers should only be considered for a subset of firms in the market. In
the Appendix we formally prove the following result:
Proposition 6 Suppose the smallest firm becomes arbitrarily small relative
to the size of the second smallest firm. Then it is optimal for the larger
firms to exclude it from an agreement on an optimal symmetric punishment
equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is very simple. Take any initial distribution of varieties
in a market. Now consider a sequence of markets in which the number of
varieties is replicated and demand normalized to leave aggregate demand
unaffected. In this sequence the number of varieties for the smallest firm is
kept fixed, while the rest of the varieties is distributed to keep the relative
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size of the remaining firms fixed. Clearly, along the sequence of markets,
n/n goes to zero. But then dropping the smallest firm will make virtually
no difference to other firms at any finite prices, because a price reduction
will have arbitrarily small effect on demand for each of the larger firms.
However, keeping the small firm in the collusive agreement limits the level
of the collusive price. By dropping the smallest firm from the collusive
agreement the collusive price can be strictly increased, making all firms
better off. Small enough firms will therefore not be part of a symmetric
optimal punishment equilibrium.
Note that this intuition must survive for fully optimal punishment schemes
as well. The smaller the firm is relative to the others, the smaller the impact
of the price of that firm on the profits of other firms. Hence, other firms
under optimal collusion will be less willing to raise the price to incentivize
a higher price by the smallest firm. As a result, very small firms must be
pricing close to their best response price in any equilibrium that is on the
Pareto frontier of the equilibrium value set. While there may be equilibria
in which the smallest firm raises prices significantly above the best response
price to the price vector charged by other firms (even when it is very small),
these equilibria will be Pareto dominated. Note that this is different from
the case of one very large firm. In that case all firms must be close to best
responding in all equilibria.
The observations we have made above have some important implications
for the application of joint dominance in general and coordinated effects
analysis in mergers in particular. It shows that it makes sense to consider
joint dominance only of a limited collusive groups as long as some firms are
much smaller than the rest. Hence, a policy that looks for a group that is
relatively homogeneous within and heterogeneous relative to smaller firms
outside the group appears to be sensible.
5.2 The Impact of Multimarket Contact on the Evaluation
of Joint Dominance
In competition policy practice the European Commission has argued that
joint dominance should be assessed market by market if the geographic mar-
kets involved in the merger are found to be separate. The analysis in this
paper suggests that this practice may not be sensible and could lead to
counterproductive remedies when coordinated effects are a concern.
Generally in competition policy cases the average market structure across
geographic markets is quite distinct from the market structure market by
market. However, from the literature on multi-market contact (see Bern-
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heim and Whinston, 1990) we know that optimal collusive schemes lead to
pooling of incentive constraints across markets. For example, if the market
structure across markets is much more heterogeneous than on average then
the market by market analysis may seriously underestimate the problem of
joint dominance overall.
Consider an example in which there are two markets, A and B, of the
type described in our model that are identical except for the ownership
structure. There is one firm that owns 70% of the varieties in market A
and 30% of the varieties in market B. It faces one firm in each of the two
markets that own the rest of the varieties but are independent from each
other. We will discuss the impact on collusion when the two independent
firms in the two separate markets merge.
Let us assume that each of the independent firms can perfectly observe
the pricing behavior in the market in which they are not present. Then,
in an optimal punishment equilibrium, punishment in both markets will be
induced if there is a deviation from collusion in any one of the markets. To
simplify the discussion we will consider optimal punishment schemes that
are symmetric in each of the markets. The incentive constraint for the large
firm is then given by:
n¯
n¯+ nφ
K¯(p∗(pA, n¯), pA, n¯) + nn¯+ nφ
K(p∗(pB, n), pB, n) (7)
≤ δ[ n¯n¯+ n
¡
π(P cA, P cA)− π(pAL , pAL)
¢
+
n
n¯+ n
¡
π(P cB, P cB)− π(pBL , pBL )
¢
]
where pi refers to the price (either collusive or punishment) that is to be
sustained and P ci refers to the most profitable sustainable price and piL to
the most severe punishment in market i. Note, that this incentive constraint
does not change for the firm active in both markets after the merger.
After the merger the two independent firms have the same incentive
constraint (7) with only the indices for the largest and smallest firm inverted.
This means that after the merger there will be the same price charged in
both markets both under optimal collusion and under optimal punishments.
Before the merger, the independent firm in market A is the smaller firm. Its
incentive constraint is given by:
φK(p∗(pA, n), pA, n) ≤ δ[π(P cA, P cA)− π(pAL , pAL)] (8)
In market B the independent firm is the larger firm and its incentive con-
straint is the appropriate analogue to (8). To understand the impact of the
merger it is convenient to first consider the equilibrium after the merger.
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Let P c and pL be the respective prices relevant for equilibrium behavior
after the merger. We will discuss whether these prices are sustainable be-
fore the merger. Note that the left hand side of (7) will be the same for
all firms at these prices due to the symmetry in the post merger equi-
librium. Now note that φK(p∗(P c, n), P c, n) > n¯n¯+nφ
K(p∗(P c, n), P c, n) +
n
n¯+nφ
K¯(p∗(P c, n¯), P c, n¯). This implies that the independent firm in market
A has a greater incentive to deviate from the collusive price than the firm
present in both markets. By a symmetric argument it has less of an incen-
tive when considering deviations from the punishment price. This implies
that incentive constraints in market A are strictly tightened relative to the
post merger market. By a symmetric argument we can establish that the
same is true in market B relative to the incentive constraint for optimal
punishments. This implies that the most profitable collusive price must (at
least weakly) be lower in both markets relative to optimal collusion after
the merger.
This analysis suggests that joint dominance or coordinated effects of
mergers should not be assessed market by market. Given the strong asym-
metry between the firms in each of the markets one would conclude that
coordinated effects were not relevant in a market by market analysis. How-
ever, this would be incorrect. The merger is, in this example, symmetry
increasing and would lead to higher prices as long as collusion is sustain-
able.
5.3 Product Innovation and the Persistence of Joint Domi-
nance
One of the features of single dominant firm positions is that there is a pow-
erful force that leads to the persistence of such dominance over time as has
been shown in the work of Gilbert and Newbery (1984). The argument
is that the payoff gain by maintaining monopoly profits over one duopoly
profit is greater than the payoff gain in obtaining one duopoly profit over
nothing. Hence, if a new variety appears firms with the greater number of
varieties will tend to have the greater incentive to bid for the new product.
Generally, such bidding for innovations will lead to the innovation being
obtained by the firm in who’s hands it maximizes industry profits. Since
greater asymmetry in static Bertrand equilibrium will tend to increase in-
dustry profits, the analysis in the absence of collusion therefore suggests a
tendency towards increasing single firm dominance in the type of market we
are discussing in this paper.
However, in the context of our analysis the question arises whether there
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is any sense in which jointly dominant positions can also be considered
to be persistent. An answer can be obtained directly from our numerical
analysis of fully optimal collusion in the duopoly case. As we have shown
in the previous section an increase in asymmetry in relatively symmetric
firms leads to reduced industry profits, while it leads to increased industry
profits when the asymmetry is large enough. Hence, for relatively symmetric
market structures the smaller firm will not only obtain the benefit of the
extra revenue stream from the new product, but also increase the per-variety
profitability of the market. In contrast, the larger firm’s acquisition of the
new variety would lower the per-variety profitability. Hence, industry profits
will be maximized by the smaller firm acquiring the product. There is
therefore a tendency towards persistence of joint dominance. Conversely,
if the firms are already in the region of single firm dominance, industry
profitability is lower when the smallest firm acquires the new product and
there is a tendency for the largest firm to become more dominant. Again,
single firm dominance persists.
Formally, these results can be seen in our numerical model directly. The
addition of another product simply changes the share of the firms in the to-
tal number of products, which is the only relevant parameter of the model.
Hence, the results derived about the effects of increasing heterogeneity di-
rectly applies to the acquisition of new products.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of acquisitions of brands by firms
in a differentiated products oligopoly and their impact on the likelihood of
collusion. In particular, we have been able to derive results on the impact of
mergers on the likelihood of collusion and the level of collusive prices that
can be attained in the market. The analysis shows that mergers do not
simply eliminate a firm from the market but change the size distribution of
remaining firms. As a result mergers involving the largest firms will typically
reduce the likelihood of collusion and the highest achievable collusive prices
due to the increased heterogeneity of firms in the market.
This analysis has important consequences for merger analysis. First, it
gives an instrument to assess the coordinated effects of mergers. Second,
it shows that either unilateral effects of mergers should be considered as
determinant for the competitive impact of mergers or coordinated effects,
but not both. Indeed, the remedies for coordinated effects in terms of asset
sell offs will typically be the opposite to those that would be appropriate
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under unilateral effects analysis.
However, there are also significant limitations to this analysis. Our re-
sults, in a strict sense, only compare the scope for collusion given one market
structure with the scope of collusion in another. The model does not model
the impact of a merger in an ongoing collusive regime. Such an analysis
would generate a large number of new questions that we have been able to
avoid here. For example, how should we deal with the problem that firms
will anticipate the possibility of mergers in the future? What change in
the market generates a merger in the first place? We have abstracted from
these questions in the paper because they have not even been satisfacto-
rily addressed in the theoretical analysis of unilateral effects. Instead we
have focused only on the incentive effect of particular asymmetries gener-
ated through asset distributions between firms. However, even this modest
approach suggests that coordinated effects analysis in mergers is a very del-
icate exercise that is difficult to capture in simple policy rules.
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7 Appendix A
In this Appendix we derive all of the results under the assumptions that
pL > 0, D(p∗(pL, nK), pL, nK) > 0 and D(p∗(P c, nK), P c, nK) > 0 for all
K unless specifically stated otherwise. These assumptions facilitate the
exposition of the argument. We discuss at the end of the appendix which
proofs would have to be adapted and how to cover the corner cases. None
of the results depend on these assumptions.
Lemma 1: The incentive constraint for the lowest value equilibrium is
always binding. Generically, we have either vˆ = π(P c, P c) and pL > 0 or
v < vˆ < π(P c, P c) and pL = 0.
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Proof: We first show that the incentive constraint for the lowest value
equilibrium must be binding. Suppose it is not. Then change the first period
punishment slightly from pL to achieve a first period punishment payoff of
π(pL, pL) − ε. Maintain vˆ as the outcome of the continuation equilibrium.
Then the continuation value after a deviation would be π(pL, pL)−ε+ δvˆ <
v and the incentive constraint on P c would be relaxed. However, since the
incentive constraint in the punishment equilibrium was supposed to be slack
we can always choose ε small enough such that this constraint remains slack.
But then v is not the lowest equilibrium value achievable, a contradiction.
Now suppose that pL > 0 and vˆ < π(P c, P c). we will show that this
contradicts the definition of pL and vˆ. Now choose a p−L < pL and a vˆ+ > vˆ
such that π(p−L , p
−
L) + δvˆ+ = v. Given the public signal σ the equilibrium
value set is convex and, therefore, such a choice of vˆ+ is always available.
But then π(p∗(pL), pL) is, by the envelope theorem, strictly reduced, making
the incentive constraint on punishments slack. But then a more severe
punishment is available,. contradicting the definitions of v, pL, and vˆ. It
follows that either vˆ = π(P c, P c) or pL = 0. QED.
Lemma 2: The best response price p∗(p, nK) is strictly increasing in p
(whenever D(p∗(p, nK), p, nK) > 0), pm > p∗(pm, nK), and p∗(c, nK) > c.
For each nK there exists a unique price pˆ(nK) > c such that p∗(pˆ(nK), nK) =
pˆ(nK). It is strictly increasing in nK.
Proof: For the proof suppose first that D(p∗(p(p, nK), p, nK) > 0.
Then, by concavity of the profit function, the best response is unique. Now
note that p∗(p, nK) maximizes ln(pK − c) + lnD(pK , p, nK). Since by as-
sumption 1 ∂
2 lnD(pK ,p,nK)
∂pK∂p > 0 it follows by standard monotone compar-
ative statics arguments that p∗(p, nK) is increasing in p. Now note that
by symmetry of the demand functions D(c, c) > 0. Then by continuity of
demand there exists p0 > c, such that D(p0, c) > 0. Hence, a firm would
prefer setting p0 to setting c, which shows that p∗(c, nK) > c. We now show
that pm > p∗(pm, nK) for all nK < n. Suppose otherwise. Note that for
(pK , p) = (pm, pm) we have that
∂π(pm, pm, nK)
∂pm = D(p
m, pm) + (pm − c)∂D(p
m, pm, nK)
∂pK
= −(pm − c)∂D(p
m, pm, nK)
∂pKc
< 0
where the equality follows from the definition of the monopoly price and
the inequality follows from demand increasing in rival prices. By concavity
of the profit function it follows that p∗(pm, nK) < pm. Furthermore, since
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the objective function is continuously differentiable it follows by the implicit
function theorem that p∗(p, nK) is continuous. By Assumption 1 it is also
a contraction mapping. Hence, there exists a unique fixed point of the best
response function as claimed.
We now show that pˆ(nK) is strictly increasing in nK . It is convenient
to define for this purposes D(pK , pnK+1,p) as the demand function where
the first nK goods are priced at price pK , the nK+1st good priced at pnK+1
and all other goods at p. Assume p ≤ pˆ(nK +1). Suppose, for contradiction
that p∗(p, nK) ≥ p∗(p, nK + 1) and consider:PnK+1
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p∗K(p,nK+1),p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1),p)
−
PnK
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK),p,p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK), p,p)
≥
PnK+1
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p∗K(p,nK+1),p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1),p)
−
PnK
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p,p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p,p)
=
PnK
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p∗K(p,nK+1),p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1), p)
+
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p∗K(p,nK+1),p)
∂pnK+1
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1), p)
−
PnK
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p,p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p,p)
≥
PnK
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p,p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1), p)
+
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p∗K(p,nK+1),p)
∂pnK+1
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1), p)
−
PnK
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p,p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK), p,p)
=
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p∗K(p,nK+1),p)
∂pnK+1
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1), p)
> 0
where the weak inequality in the second line follows from the assumption
that p∗(p, nK) ≥ p∗(p, nK + 1) and the log-concavity of demand. The weak
inequality in the penultimate line follows from the strategic complementarity
assumption (Assumption 1(i)). It implies that the cross-derivative of log-
demand in pK and pnK+1 must be strictly positive. But now note that by
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the first order condition of profit maximization it follows thatPnK+1
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK+1),p∗K(p,nK+1),p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK + 1), p∗K(p, nK + 1),p)
−
PnK
j=1
∂D(p∗K(p,nK),p,p)
∂pj
D(p∗K(p, nK), p,p)
= − 1p∗K(p, nK + 1)− c
+
1
p∗K(p, nK)− c
> 0
which implies p∗K(p, nK+1) > p∗K(p, nK), a contradiction to our assumption
that p∗K(p, nK + 1) ≤ p∗K(p, nK). Hence, p∗K(p, nK + 1) > p∗K(p, nK) when
p ≤ pˆ(nK+1). But then it follows directly that pˆ(nK+1) > pˆ(nK), because
p∗(p, nK) must have crossed the 450-line to be strictly below p∗(p, nK + 1)
at pˆ(nK + 1).
Lemma 3: Suppose nK > nK0, then φK(p∗(p, nK), p) > φK0(p∗(p, nK0), p),
if p < pˆ(nK0) and φK(p∗(p, nK), p) < φK0(p∗(p, nK), p), if p > pˆ(nK).
Proof: By Lemma 2, pˆ(nK) increases in nK . Hence, pˆ(nK) > pˆ(nK0).
First, consider the case p < pˆ(nK0). Then p∗(p, nJ) > p for J = K,K 0.Therefore,
φK(p∗(p, nK), p) ≥ φK(p∗(p, nK0), p) > φK0(p∗(p, nK0), p), where the first
inequality follows because p∗(p, nK) is optimal for firm K and the second
inequality is implied by the fact that profit functions for each variety con-
trolled by K and K 0 respectively differ only on the prices of nK − nK0
goods. These goods are priced at p in the case of firm K 0 but at price
p∗(p, nK0) > p for firm K. Since the profits of each variety at a short
run optimal price are increasing in the prices of other goods the inequal-
ity must hold. The argument for the case p > pˆ(nK) is analogous: In
this case both firms’ best response is a price strictly below p. We have
φK0(p∗(p, nK0), p) ≥ φK0(p∗(p, nK), p) > φK(p∗(p, nK), p), where the last in-
equality comes from the fact that each variety controlled by firm K faces
nK − nK0 varieties less charging p > p∗(p, nK).
Lemma 3A: For all K the incentive for firm K to deviate from price
p, φK(p∗(p, nK), p), is strictly quasi-convex in p.
Proof: By definition of p∗(p, nK), the functionφK(p∗(p, nK), p) achieves
a minimum at pˆ(nK). To prove quasi-convexity we only have to show that
φK(p∗(p, nK), p) is increasing at p > pˆ(nK) and decreasing for p < pˆ(nK).
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Suppose first that p > pˆ(nK). Then:
dφK(p∗(p, nK), p)
dp = π
K
pK0 (p
∗(p, nK), p)− πKpK0 (p, p)− π
K
pK (p, p)
= −
Z p
p∗(p,nK)
πKpK0pK (z, p)dz − π
K
pK (p, p)
= −
Z p
p∗(p,nK)
h
πKpK0pK (z, p) + π
K
pKpK (z, p)
i
dz − πKpK (p
∗(p, nK), p)
= −
Z p
p∗(p,nK)
h
πKpK0pK (z, p) + π
K
pKpK (z, p)
i
dz > 0
where the last equality follows from the definition of p∗(p, nK) and the last
inequality follows from assumption 1 since own-effects are assumed to domi-
nate cross-effects effects. To complete the proof note that p < pˆ(nK) implies
that in the second line above πKpK (p, p) > 0, so that by strategic complemen-
tarity it follows that dφ
K(p∗(p,nK),p)
dp < 0.
Proposition 1: In any symmetric optimal punishment equilibrium: (a)
the smallest firm always has the largest incentive to deviate from the most
profitable collusive price P c, and (b) the largest firm has the greatest incen-
tive to deviate from the optimal punishment price pL.
Proof: We first prove part (a) of the proposition. Let Υ be the set of
firms that have a strict incentive to deviate upwards at P c and let ∆ be the
set of firms that have a weak incentive to deviate downwards. If P c ≥ pˆ(n¯),
then Υ = ∅ and K ∈ ∆, so that by Lemma 3 the proposition holds trivially.
Suppose P c < pˆ(n¯). Then K¯ ∈ Υ and K ∈ ∆ or ∆ = ∅. Hence, by Lemma
3, either K¯ or K has the highest incentive to deviate from P c. Suppose it
were K¯. By Lemma 3A, φK¯(p∗(p, n¯), p) is strictly quasi-convex in p, and the
incentive constraint of K¯ can be relaxed by setting P c + ε. Since all other
incentive constraints (5) were slack on P c we can always choose ε small
enough, so they remain slack. But then all incentive constraints (6) on pL
can still be satisfied because vˆ must still be feasible if π(P c, P c) increases.
Hence, all firms make higher profits (since pˆ(n¯) < pm) by strict concavity
of revenue. This contradicts the definition of P c as the most profitable
sustainable collusive price. Hence, K has the highest incentive to deviate
from P c.
To prove part (b) of the proposition, suppose 0 ≤ pL < p(n). Then
∆ = ∅ and by Lemma 3 firm K¯ has the largest incentive to deviate up-
wards. Suppose pL ≥ p(n). Then K ∈ ∆ and either K¯ ∈ Υ or Υ = ∅.
Hence, by Lemma 2, either K or K¯ has the highest incentive to deviate.
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Suppose it is K and therefore pL > p(n) > 0. Then, by quasi-convexity
of φK(p∗(p, nK), p) in p (Lemma 3A), the incentive constraint of K with
respect to pL can be strictly relaxed by lowering pL slightly and maintain-
ing vˆ without making other constraints binding. Furthermore, all incentive
constraints on P c would be strictly relaxed, contradicting the definition of
pL. Hence, only the incentive of the largest firm to deviate determines the
punishment price pL.
Lemma 4: For every pc > c there exists a unique δ¯(pc) such that this
price can be sustained forever at a maximal punishment equilibrium if and
only if δ ≥ δ¯(pc)˙.
Proof: Since all expressions in (??) and (6) are continuously differen-
tiable in δ and p, it follows by the implicit function theorem that the two
schedules pK¯L (δ) and p
K
L (δ) are continuous. First, assume that pK¯L (1) >
pKL (1). Then, given that pK¯L (0) > p
K
L (0), there exists at least one δ¯, such
that pK¯L (δ¯) = p
K
L (δ¯). Clearly at this point the incentives of the largest firm
to deviate from pL and the incentives of the smallest firm to deviate from
pc must be equal, so that:
φK(p∗(pc, n), pc) = φK¯(p∗(pK¯L (δ¯), n¯), pK¯L (δ¯)). (9)
Suppose that there exists another intersection. Then there exists either a
δ > δ¯ such that pK¯L (δ) ≥ p
K
L (δ) or a δ < δ¯ such that pK¯L (δ) ≤ p
K
L (δ). Consider
the first case. Then δ
h
πK¯(pK¯L (δ), pK¯L (δ))− πK¯(pc, pc)
i
> φK(p∗(pc, nK), pc).
But since by Lemma 2, pK¯L (δ) < pˆ(n¯) for all δ and by Lemma 3 φK¯(p∗(p, n¯), p)
is decreasing at p < pˆ(n¯), the incentive constraint of K¯ must be slack at
pK¯L (δ), a contradiction. By a symmetric argument it is shown that the in-
centive constraint is violated if pK¯L (δ) ≤ p
K
L (δ) at some δ < δ¯, again contra-
dicting the definition of pL. Hence, there is a unique intersection between
the schedules pK¯L (δ) and p
K
L (δ) as shown in Figure 2. Now suppose that
pK¯L (1) ≤ p
K
L (1). Then, by monotonicity of p
K
L (1) there is no intersection
between the two schedules. In fact, whenever (5) is satisfied, (6) must be
strictly slack. Hence, δ¯ solves pKL (δ¯) = 0 in this case. Now note that all
incentive constraints are relaxed when δ is increased. Hence, since by def-
inition pc can just be sustained forever at δ¯(pc), it can be sustained if and
only if δ ≥ δ¯(pc).
Proposition 2: There exists δ and δ¯(pm) with δ < δ¯(pm) < 1 such that
for all δ ∈ [δ, 1] there exists an optimal symmetric punishment equilibrium.
The optimal collusive price P c(δ) is equal to pm for all δ ∈ [δ¯(pm), 1] and
it is strictly increasing on δ ∈ [δ, δ¯(pm)], piecewise continuous with at most
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a finite number of upward jumps. The optimal punishment price pL(δ) is
decreasing in δ on δ ∈ [δ, 1] and strictly decreasing when pL(δ) > 0.
Proof: By our argument above there exists a function δ¯(pc) that relates
the price pc to the lowest discount factor at which it can be sustained and
hence has a global minimum on [p, pm]. Since both incentive conditions are
continuously differentiable it follows from the implicit function theorem that
δ¯(pc) is continuous. Let Pδ be the set of prices that are sustainable at δ.
Since δ¯(pc) is continuous and for every pair (δ, pc) that is weakly above the
schedule pc can be sustained at δ, it follows that this set is bounded and
closed so that P c(δ) ≡ min{pm,max Pδ}, whenever Pδ is non-empty. Since
for δ close to 1 a punishment price pL arbitrarily close to 0 is sustainable for
any pc > c and gains from deviation become arbitrarily small relative to the
losses from continuing with pL, the incentive constraint for k must become
slack for δ → 1. Hence, δ¯(pm) < 1.
Now note that Pδ¯(p
m) contains a set of prices below pm. To see this note
that a small change in pc at pm has only a second order effect on π(pc, pc).
Hence, any accommodating change in pL to leave the incentive constraint
of k¯ unchanged has a second order effect on π(pL, pL). But this means that
any small change in pc that leaves k¯ on his incentive constraint will have
only a second order effect on k’s losses from inducing punishments. At the
same time, φ(p∗(pc, nK), pc, nK) is strictly increasing at pc = pm, a first
order effect. Hence, the incentive constraint of k can be made strictly slack
at δ¯(pm) for some small interval of prices (pˆc, pm). It follows that some price
pc < pm from that interval can be sustained at some δˆ < δ¯(pm) and for all
higher δ. Hence, there exists δ ≥ 0 such that δ < δ¯(pm) such that collusion
at some price pc forever is sustainable for all δ ≥ δ. Furthermore, Since for
some δˆ > 0 we have pKL (δˆ) = 0 and δˆ ≤ δ from the proof of Lemma 4 it
follows that δ > 0.
Now consider any δ ≥ δ and δ+ > δ. Clearly, at δ+, both incentive
constraints are slack for (P c(δ), pL(δ)), so that some price strictly above
P c(δ) is sustainable. Hence, P c(δ) is strictly increasing in δ on (δ, δ¯(pm))
and is constant above that. To complete the proof of the properties of P c(δ)
note that, by continuity of δ¯(pc), P c(δ) must change continuously unless
there is a strict upward jump to a local minimum of δ¯(pc). Since there
must be generically only a finite number of minima of this function P c(δ)
will therefore be continuous except possibly for a finite number of upward
jumps.
To prove the properties of pL(δ) first note that at δ¯(pc) ≤ δ¯(pm) we must
have
φK(p∗(pc, n), pc) = φK¯(p∗(pL, n¯), pL) = 0,
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unless pL = 0. Since by Lemma 3 and proposition 1 the function φK(p∗(pc, n), pc)
is increasing in pc and φK¯(p∗(pL, n¯), pL) is decreasing in pL, pL(δ) has to
be lower when P c(δ) is higher as long as pL(δ) > 0. Hence, pL(δ) inherits
the monotonicity properties of P c(δ) on (δ, δ¯(pm)), as long as pL(δ) > 0.
If pL(δ) = 0 for some δ it will be zero for all higher δ. For δ > δ¯(pm),
PL(δ) = P K¯L (δ) and therefore decreasing in δ.
Proposition 3: (a) Suppose that K is the same under κ1 and κ2. Then
δ(κ1) > δ(κ2) if and only if K¯1 > K¯2. (b) Suppose that K¯ is the same under
κ1 and κ2. Then δ(κ1) > δ(κ2) if and only if K1 < K2.
Proof: By definition δ(κ1) is the lowest discount factor for which col-
lusion can be sustained under κ1. Let the corresponding collusive price be
P c(κ1) and optimal punishment price PL(κ1). We now show that an equilib-
rium with pc = P c(κ1) and pL = PL(κ1) can still be sustained under κ2, but
leaves the incentive constraint for firm k unchanged. Since K1 = K2, it is
immediate that firm k’s incentive constraint still holds with equality under
κ1. Since K¯1 > K¯2, the incentives have changed for firm k¯. Since the num-
ber of varieties of the largest firm goes down when switching to distribution
κ2, by Lemma 3A, the incentive to deviate for the largest firm goes down at
given collusive and punishment prices. Hence, the incentive constraint of k¯
becomes strictly slack. Then pL could be slightly decreased to pˆL = pL − ε
and the incentive condition for k¯ would still be slack. But the incentive
condition for k would now also be strictly slack. Hence, collusion at price
pc = P c(κ1) and pL = pˆL can also be sustained for some δ < δ(κ1). Then
δ(κ1) > δ(κ2), proving part (a). The argument for part (b) is symmetric
and omitted.
Proposition 4:Consider a transaction that changes the distribution of
varieties in the market from κ1 to κ2 and fix δ ∈ [δmax, δ¯min). Then: (a)
If K¯1 < K¯2 and K1 = K2 then P c(δ, κ1) > P c(δ, κ2), (b) If K1 < K2
and K¯1 = K¯2 then P c(δ, κ1) < P c(δ, κ2), and (c) Among all redistributions
of assets between two firms, those from the largest to the smallest firm will
increase P c most, as long as these do not make the previously smallest firm
into the largest firm.
Proof: To prove part (a), we first show that an equilibrium with
pc = P c(δ, κ2) and pL = PL(δ, κ2) can still be sustained under κ2. Since
K1 = K2, it is immediate that firm k’s incentive constraint still holds with
equality under κ1. Since K¯1 < K¯2, the incentives have changed for firm
k¯: the number of varieties of the largest firm goes down when switching to
distribution κ1. By Lemma 3A, the incentive to deviate for the largest firm
goes down at given collusive and punishment prices when switching from κ2
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to κ1. Hence, the incentive constraint of k¯ becomes strictly slack. Then pL
could be slightly decreased to pˆL = pL − ε and the incentive condition for k¯
would still be slack. But then the incentive condition for k would now also
be strictly slack. Hence, collusion at price pc = P c(κ1) + γ and pL = pˆL
can also be sustained for the same δ. It follows that P c(δ, κ1) > P c(δ, κ2),
proving part (a). The argument for part (b) is symmetric and omitted. To
prove (c) note that the most a single transaction can change the incentives
of the largest firm is by making it as large as the second largest firm. Sim-
ilarly, the most that the size of the smallest firm can be increased is to the
size of the second smallest firm. any transaction between the largest and
the smallest firm will therefore relax both the upward and the downward
incentive constraints, as long as the transaction does not turn the smallest
firm into the largest. The claim then follows from parts (a) and (b).
Lemma 5:Suppose that pKL 6= 0 for all K. Then the equilibrium value set
of the full game under quadratic preferences is the same as the equilibrium
value set of a game in which the firms are restricted to charging the same
price on each variety they control.
If pKL 6= 0 for all K any value in the value set can be generated from the
profits generated by a price vector p that satisfies the incentive constraints
in one period and the corresponding continuation value. In this case the
continuation value will always be from the Pareto frontier of the equilibrium
value set or, after a deviation, the values that correspond to the lowest
equilibrium value for the deviating firm. This means that we can generate
the whole equilibrium value set from a problem in which firms are restricted
to set the same price for all products in their product line if prices that
support equilibria on the Pareto frontier of the equilibrium set or prices
that support optimal punishments have the equal price property. We now
show that this is the case.
We first show that an equilibrium in which some firm charges different
prices for products in its product line cannot generate a value on the Pareto
frontier of the equilibrium value set. Note that any price vector that sup-
ports an equilibrium that generates a point on the Pareto frontier of the
equilibrium value set must involve this price vector being set forever. As-
sume that the price vector involves one firm charging different prices for
products in its product line. Then the price vector pK has to satisfy:X
i∈K
πi(pK ,pkc) = (1− δ)
X
i∈K
πi(p∗K(pKc),pKc) + δvK
where vK is the lowest average continuation profit achievable in any equi-
librium for firm K. By symmetry of the profit function the best response
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prices in the vector p∗K(pKc) are the same for all products in the product
line ofK. Now note that under the linear demand system demand for good i
only depends on its own price and the averages of the prices in each product
line. Hence, if we leave the average price for firm K unchanged no incentive
constraints for other firms are affected. On the other hand the incentive
constraints for firm K can be strictly relaxed if
P
i∈K πi(pK ,pKc) can be
increased while leaving the average price in the product line K unchanged.
Since
P
i∈K πi(pK ,pKc) is quasi-concave in pK it has a unique maximum
relative to a linear constraint. Furthermore, by symmetry of the objective
and the constraint this maximum is achieved at equal prices. Hence, a price
vector pK can only support an equilbirium that generates a point on the
Pareto frontier of the equilibrium value set if the prices for all products in
product line K are the same.
Now consider the worst equilibrium for firm K. First consider whether
a firm other than firm K could ever charge different prices in an equilibrium
that generates the most severe punishment for K. Let us call that firm J .
Then the incentive constraint for J is given by:
(1− δ)
X
i∈J
πi(pJLK ,pJ
c
LK) + δv¯JK ≥ (1− δ)
X
i∈K
πi(p∗J(pJ
c
LK),pJ
c
LK) + δvJ
where pjLK is the the punishment price vector charged by firm j when firm
K has deviated in the previous period. v¯JK is the continuation value for
J when pLK is charged. It must be on the Pareto frontier of the value
set given the assumptionn of the Lemma. Finally, vJ is the continuation
value should firm J deviate from pJLK . As before fix the average price in
the price vector pJLK . By the same argument as before it is shown that the
incentive constraint is strictly relaxed if firm J charges the average price for
all products in the product line. Since the average price is unchanged, no
other incentive constraint is affected. But then firm J can lower its average
price with its incentive constraint still slack. But lowering pJLK will relax
the incentive constraints for all other firms. Hence, the punishment for firm
K can be made more severe, violating the assumption that pLK was the
vector supporting optimal punishments for firm K.
Finally, we need to consider whether firm K would ever charge different
prices for its products when it is punished. Suppose it did. As in the previous
arguments we know that a firm can always get higher profits from having
the same prices for a given average price. Hence, it could obtain the same
profits as with different prices at some lower average price which is set for all
firms. But given that all other firms charge symmetric punishment prices it
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is straightforward to show that the incentive constraints for all firms J 6= K
are strictly relaxed. Hence, the punishment prices charged by firms J 6= K
can be reduced, which implies that an even lower punishment continuation
value forK is achievable. It follows that the optimal punishment equilibrium
for K does not have any firm charge different prices on its product line.
Proposition 6: Suppose the smallest firm becomes arbitrarily small rel-
ative to the size of the second smallest firm. Then it is optimal for the larger
firms to exclude it from an agreement on an optimal symmetric punishment
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a situation with m+ 1 firms. We consider a sequence
of industries along which we keep the number of varieties for the smallest
firm fixed but replicate the number of varieties for all other firms along this
sequence. In other words for all firms K 6= K we have ntK = 2nt−1K , while
nt = n for all t where t goes to infinity. Note that along this sequence the
number of varieties evolves as nt = 2(nt−1−n)+n so that the total number
of varieties goes to infinity as well. By the assumption that¯¯¯¯
∂ lnDK(pK ,pKc)
∂pK
¯¯¯¯
>
X
j∈Kc
∂ lnDK(pK ,pKc)
∂pj
(10)
it then must be the case that
P
j∈K
∂DK(pK ,pKc)
∂pj converges to zero at least
at rate 1t as t→∞. This is the main property we use for this proof.
Now consider two possible equilibria in the market. First, the equilibrium
in which all firms collude according to the equilibrium in section 3 of the
paper. This is characterized by the punishment price pallL and the highest
sustainable collusive price P call. Second, consider the equilibrium that is
obtained when all firms except for the smallest optimally collude conditional
on the smallest firm simply using a best response. We will show that the
latter equilibrium will have a strictly higher collusive price pc = P call+ ε can
be sustained and as a result strictly higher profits whenenver the smallest
firm is small enough relative to the next larger firm.
Let eK be the second smallest firm. We now construct an equilibrium
with pc for the collusive price and pL for the punishment price, such that this
can be sustained with firm K best responding. We simplify the proof by
assuming that demand approaches infinity at zero price. Let π(p, p∗K(p))
be the profit per variety of firms other than K when K best responds
to price p, and let πK(p∗(p), p, p∗K(p)) be the best response profit of firm
K when others play p except for firm K who best responds to every-
one esle charging p. Note that limt→∞[π(p, p) − π(p, p∗K(p))] = 0 and
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limt→0
h
πK(p∗(p), p, p)− πK(p∗(p), p, p∗K(p))
i
= 0. If the incentive compat-
ibility constraint for the second largest firm is satisfied, we would have:
φ ?K(p∗(pc), pc, p∗K(pc)) ≥ δ
£
π(pc, p∗K(pc))− π(pL, pL, p∗K(pL))
¤
(11)
Taking limits for t→∞ on both sides we have:
φ ?K(p∗(pc), pc, pc) ≥ δ [π(pc, pc)− π(pL, pL, pL)] (12)
Now note that at pc = P c, this incentive constraint is strictly slack because
firm eK is strictly larger than firm K. Hence, for some t <∞ there will still
exist ε > 0 such that the constraint is slack. Now consider the incentive
comnstraint for the largest firm, which takes into account that pc is the new
collusive price that can be sustained:
φ ?K(p∗(pL), pL, p∗K(pL)) ≥ δ
£
π(pc, p∗K(pc))− π(pL, pL, p∗K(pL))
¤
Taking limits on both sides yields:
φ ?K(p∗(pL), pL, pL) ≥ δ [π(pc, pc))− π(pL, pL, pL)]
This is the same constraint as in the case where firm K is included in the
collusive scheme, only that pc > P c. Hence, relative to that benchmark the
incentive constraint at the limit is strictly relaxed. We can therefore find a t
large enough and an ε > 0 such that both incentive constraints are saistified.
Hence, for t large enough some pc > P c is sustainable. Furthermore since
lim
t→∞
[π(pc, p∗K(pc))− π(P c, P c)] = π(pc, pc)− π(P c, P c) > 0
the colluding firms strictly benefit from excluding the smallest firm for large
enough t. Hence, if the smallest firm becomes arbitrarily small relative to
the second smallest, the other firms benefit by letting that firm best respond
and limiting the collusive scheme to themselves.
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